Delimiting the "Unsayable": Wittgenstein and Logical Holism

Abstract

This paper aims to clarify a long-standing misconception in the history of philosophy by reconstructing the core arguments of early Wittgenstein’s philosophy, namely the identification of his early thought with the Logical Atomism advocated by Bertrand Russell. Through a systematic analysis of Wittgenstein's strict demarcation between the "sayable" and the "unsayable," his particular treatment of the concept of "generality," and the priority of propositions over words in his theory of meaning, we argue that Wittgenstein’s early philosophy is essentially a form of Logical Holism. This holism is not a metaphysical doctrine about the composition of the world but the necessary conclusion of his linguistic critique and study of logical syntax. It fundamentally rejects the atomistic model that posits simple entities as the foundation of meaning. Furthermore, this paper will reveal that this holistic perspective, grounded in the "unsayable," provides a deep and coherent philosophical foundation for his later "grammatical investigations" in the Philosophical Investigations and his revolutionary epistemological views concerning "certainty" and "world-picture" in On Certainty [1]. This paper concludes that understanding Wittgenstein solely through the label of "Logical Atomism" not only obscures the originality and profundity of his thought but also severs the intrinsic conceptual thread, based on "delimitation" and "showing," that connects his early and later philosophy.