Multiple Major Shareholders and Corporate Leverage Manipulation

Abstract

This article takes the financial manipulation behavior of enterprises under the background of China's leverage regulatory policies as the entry point, focusing on the mechanism of the impact of multiple major shareholder structures on corporate leverage manipulation. Based on a sample of non-financial listed companies in China's A-share market from 2008 to 2023, empirical research is conducted. Research has found that compared to a single controlling shareholder structure, equity arrangements with multiple major shareholders significantly enhance the level of leverage manipulation in enterprises, and this boosting effect still holds true after a series of robustness tests. The research conclusion not only provides a new corporate governance perspective for understanding leverage manipulation behavior, but also provides empirical evidence and policy implications for regulatory agencies to improve the leverage regulatory framework and optimize the design of corporate equity structures. It suggests that attention should be paid to the governance efficiency boundary of multiple shareholder structures and the potential regulatory arbitrage risks that may arise.